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In announcing the revised Fiji budget for 2007, the Interim Finance 
Minister claimed that there was little choice for the economy but to 
swim, or else it would sink. This survey endorses the Interim Minister’s 
view that the prevailing economic problems are the cumulative outcome 
of decades of poor economic management but disagrees with his 
conclusion that the only options are ‘swimming’ or ‘sinking’. Much 
like the previous three coups, the December 2006 coup exacerbated 
an economic decline that was well under way when the current 
administration took office. Each coup, moreover, has on average wiped 
off three years of economic progress. Hard choices have to be made, 
and the Interim Government has to learn to swim out of the economic 
turbulence created by the last coup. Failing that, the administration 
could ‘just float’, but is more likely to be sucked into an economic crisis 
that will draw many more into poverty. Learning to swim will entail 
restoring political stability, improving governance, and charting a clear 
and quick path to democratic rule.
The Interim Finance Minister, Mahendra 
Chaudhry, in launching the revised budget 
for 2007 stated that
[w]e are at a juncture where we either 
sink or swim as a nation. I intend to 
make sure that we swim. To do this we 
will have to make some sacrifices. We 
will need to address these challenges 
now (Fijilive, 2 March 2007).
While this economic survey endorses the 
view of tough economic times facing Fiji, 
it questions whether sinking is an option. 
Moreover, the reputation of the Interim 
Government is dependent in large part on 
reviving the ailing economy. Achieving 
this goal has been made more difficult by 
the economic contraction following the 
coup of 5 December 2006. In its review of 
the economy in February 2007, the Reserve 
Bank of Fiji announced that some 3,000 
jobs had been lost since the coup due to 
the closure of the gold mine and the slump 
in the tourism industry. At the time of the 
writing of this survey, the economic fallout 
from the coup was far from over. 
The immediate challenge facing the 
administration is maintaining foreign 
reserves at adequate levels. The closure 
of the gold mine in Vatukoula around the 
time of the coup created a dent of some 
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7 per cent in foreign exchange earnings 
from merchandise exports. The mine 
provided some 1,700 jobs and the spillover 
benefits to the surrounding locality. While 
the operators of the mine had argued for 
immediate closure, given its deteriorating 
commercial position, the timing of the 
closure announcement (on the day of 
the coup) was a severe blow to investor 
confidence. In the immediate aftermath of 
the coup, the Reserve Bank of Fiji tightened 
foreign exchange controls to protect reserves, 
which have been falling since 2002. 
There is little escape from the fact that 
the economy has been hit hard by the 
coup. Exports are down, investments are 
on hold, and jobs are being lost. Tourism 
holds the best prospects for an economic 
revival, but this requires the lifting of travel 
restrictions and a return to normalcy in 
diplomatic relations between the major 
source destinations, Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States.
Without subsidies of some kind, Fiji is 
never going to be a source of mass-produced 
manufactures for the global market place 
(Winters and Martin 2004). Its small size, 
relative isolation from the major industrial 
country markets, and higher unit labour 
costs than its competitors are disadvantages 
for manufacturing activities that have been 
offset by the substantial subsidies provided 
via the preferential trading arrangements. 
Contrary to the claims of the Interim 
Minister of Finance, the prospects of a 
complete revival of the sugar industry are 
poor and those for garment exports just as 
rickety. International conditions for both 
of these exports have worsened, with the 
price premium earned by local producers 
from trade preferences in their main markets 
on the ebb. Garment and sugar producers 
were already facing severe adjustment costs 
as a result of the changing international 
conditions; their main hopes rested with 
growth in the rest of the economy and 
adjustment assistance from the donors and 
the government. The coup has put all of 
these hopes at risk.
The key messages of this survey are
• the economy is declining, and the 
worsening external and internal 
imbalances make an economic revival 
all the more urgent. Such a revival 
requires the rebuilding of investor 
confidence and the removal of the 
many conflicting policies that have been 
adopted by previous governments. 
• the gains from the expanding global 
and regional economies could be tapped 
better by deepening trade links; and this 
gives urgency to the relaxation of capital 
controls and a return to ‘normalcy’ 
so that travel restrictions by source 
destinations for tourists can be eased. 
• that each coup has cost Fiji a minimum 
of three years of economic progress, and 
lowered the rate of growth of income by 
slowing down private investment and 
encouraging capital flight.
Clearly the coup culture has to be eradicated 
if prosperity is to have a chance. However, 
economic prosperity is as much a product of 
peaceful coexistence as it is a cause of it.
Coups and more coups?
Fiji has had four military coups in its 37-year 
post-independence history. Each coup had its 
own drivers, but a reason given for the first 
three was to return the political leadership 
to the indigenous peoples. The two coups of 
1987 and that of 2000 displaced governments 
that were purported to be dominated by 
Indo-Fijians and thus were condoned by the 
chiefs in their role as the representatives of 
the indigenous population, by the Methodist 
church which has a majority indigenous 
following, and by the army which is also 
dominated by indigenous Fijians. In each 
case, the overthrow of a constitutionally 
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elected government had a deleterious impact 
on the economy and on private investment 
in particular. They also signaled that rule by 
the gun had superiority over rule through 
the ballot box, and consequently eroded the 
legitimacy of legislated constructs such as 
the constitution and respect for institutions 
of civil society. 
The downward trend in investment 
since the first coup is partly visible in 
the form of the deteriorating physical 
infrastructure. Suva rarely had water cuts 
and ‘brown-out’ was not a term with any 
currency in pre 1987 Fiji. The corrosive 
effects of the coups are also visible in the 
form of potholes, and spurts in violent 
crime in their immediate aftermath. With 
respect to violent crime, the 2006 coup was 
different as soldiers clamped down heavily 
on socially disruptive behaviour—but the 
potential for violence remains.
The first coup sanctioned income 
redistribution to the indigenous population; 
with the policies supporting the redistribution 
often couched in terms of poverty reduction. 
However, these redistribution policies 
have lent themselves to abuse, particularly 
by the élite. The largest scam in Fiji’s 
history—the National Bank of Fiji financial 
disaster, which cost taxpayers some F$220 
million—was undertaken under the guise 
of affirmative action. The beneficiaries of 
this scam were far from being poor Fijians; 
rather, the scam was a tax imposed on the 
poor for the benefit of the rich. Many more 
scams have followed. According to one 
estimate, losses due to corruption and abuse 
of office in the decade to 2002 amounted 
to half a billion Fiji dollars (Siwatibau, 
Fiji Post, 7 February 2002). Moreover, the 
abuses of office have extended well beyond 
corruption. Abuses of legal processes such 
as the release of prisoners on compulsory 
supervision orders have also followed. In 
sum, good governance has been a major, 
albeit a silent, victim of past coups.
The 2006 coup was rationalised as one 
to improve governance; whether this is the 
case remains to be seen. Many in Fiji are 
disillusioned by the deteriorating state of 
the physical and social infrastructure. The 
Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) had 
been voicing its opposition to what it saw 
as abuses of office since 2004 and in the lead 
up to the elections threatened a ‘clean up’ 
should the elected government continue 
with the abuses.
The dwindling foreign reserves, rising 
unemployment, and worsening poverty all 
pointed to a gloomy future. In hindsight, 
it is clear that something had to give. 
The coup by the RFMF was a surprise to 
many only because the Commander had 
so often threatened the overthrow of the 
government. 
At least in rhetoric, the coup of 2006 is 
significantly different from the previous 
coups. Importantly for this survey, the 
Interim Prime Minister on taking office 
committed his administration to
• upholding the Constitution
• eradicating ‘systematic’ corruption
• introducing ‘Code of Conduct and 
Freedom of Information’ provisions
• facilitating sustained growth of the 
economy
• reducing poverty and levels of 
destitution in the nation
• ensuring that a greater share of the 
benefits from utilisation of natural 
resources, land included, flowed to the 
owners, and 
• i m p ro v i n g  re l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e 
international community. 
It may be early days to assess progress on 
each of the commitments, but a start is made 
here. There is evidence of some improvement 
in law and order, not withstanding the 
disturbing allegations of human rights 
abuses; raising questions regarding the 
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commitment to uphold the Constitution. 
On the second, an anti-corruption agency 
has been established. This is a marked 
improvement on past administrations, given 
that such action was first proposed in 1997 in 
a report commissioned by the then Finance 
Minister and produced by the former head 
of the Serious Fraud Unit of New Zealand. 
As of April 2007, there were media reports 
of raids on offices suspected of being 
engaged in corrupt dealings and evidence 
being gathered. No successful prosecutions 
have as yet materialised, although it has 
to be recognised that bringing such cases 
to court is a lengthy process. On the third 
commitment, code of conduct and freedom 
of information provisions are as yet to be 
produced.
Progress on the final four commitments 
is difficult to evaluate for several reasons, 
including the fact that they are intertwined 
and any evidence of their progress is likely 
to become clear only slowly. As of April 
2007, the economy was showing little signs 
of a rebound, foreign exchange reserves 
were still at precariously low levels, poverty 
was showing little signs of improving, and 
relations with the international community 
was just beginning to thaw following the 
meeting of Forum Foreign Ministers in 
Port Vila. 
It is early days to pass judgment on 
whether the coup of 2006 will be the last 
or whether the RFMF elevates itself to a 
position where democracy will be allowed 
but only with its blessing. However, the 
public will soon be in a position to judge 
progress on each of the developmental 
and governance commitments made by 
the Interim Prime Minister. A favourable 
scenario for Fiji would be where the quality 
of governance improves rapidly in the 
next 12 months, successful prosecutions 
are made with respect to some high profile 
cases of abuse of office, private investment 
rebounds, the economy begins to grow, 
and the levels of poverty and destitution 
begin to recede. Such a scenario would set 
in train the virtuous effects of economic 
prosperity on peace for the rebuilding of 
institutions of civil society and a jettisoning 
of the coup culture. Converse scenarios 
are too frightening to contemplate as they 
could include the economy spinning out of 
control and simultaneous political chaos; 
which would be akin to a rapid sinking to 
the depths of ‘couptopia’. 
The macroeconomy
Aggregate GDP has been forecast by the 
Interim Government to contract by 2.5 per 
cent in 2007 after having grown by 3.6 per 
cent in 2006 (Reserve Bank of Fiji 2006).1 
Per capita GDP for the 35 years since 
independence grew at an annual average 
rate of less than 1.4 per cent (Figure 1). The 
growth rate of per capita GDP, moreover, has 
been highly volatile. The figure also shows 
that per capita GDP contracted substantially 
in the years of coups—by 7 per cent in 1987 
and by 2.7 per cent in 2000. In terms of 
growth collapses, the 1987 coup set Fiji back 
in terms of per capita GDP by six years (Table 
1). In comparative terms, the 2000 coup was 
less damaging as it set the country back in 
terms of per capita GDP by two years.
Assuming a population growth rate of 
one per cent, per capita GDP in 2007 will 
fall by 3.5 per cent; this will wipe off at least 
two and a half years of economic progress. 
Thus, each of the past coups has wiped 
off, on average, three years of economic 
growth. The impact of the coups on poverty, 
however, could have been a lot larger than 
these average figures suggest. One in eight 
in the population were in poverty in 1977; 
this figure had risen to one in four by 1991 
and to one in three by 2001 (United Nations 
Development Programme 1996; Abbott 
2007).
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Figure 1 Level and rate of growth of per capita GDP, 1970–2005
Source: World Bank, 2007. World Development Indicators, World Bank, Washington, DC.
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Fiji is somewhat anomalous amongst the 
United Nations Development Programme’s 
(UNDP) medium Human Development 
Index (HDI) nations in terms of the incidence 
of poverty relative to per capita income. The 
most recent data, that of 2004, shows Fiji had 
a purchasing-power-parity adjusted (PPP) 
per capita GDP of F$6,066 and some 34.4 per 
cent of the population were in poverty (the 
poverty percentage is based on the national 
poverty line, Table 2). Countries similar to 
Fiji on this count were Kazakhstan, which 
had a per capita GDP of F$7,440 and a 
poverty rate of 34.6 per cent; Belarus with 
a per capita GDP of F$6,970 and a poverty 
rate of 41.9 per cent; and Columbia with a 
per capita GDP of F$7,256 and a poverty 
rate of 64 per cent (UNDP 2007). Others 
with poverty rates similar to Fiji but with 
much lower incomes included Philippines 
and Papua New Guinea, which had 36.8 
per cent and 37.5 per cent, respectively, of 
their population in poverty, but had per 
capita incomes that were 76 per cent and 42 
per cent, respectively, of Fiji’s. Sri Lanka, a 
nation in the midst of a civil war since 1983, 
had still managed to keep poverty one-third 
lower than that of Fiji, with an income that 
was only 62 per cent that of Fiji (Table 2). 
Poverty has been on the increase in Fiji 
and this trend is likely to continue. Real 
wages of unskilled workers fell by some 15 
per cent over the decade to 2002 (Abbott 
2007). The earnings of those fortunate 
enough to have work have often been 
insufficient to fund the minimal basic needs 
of their households; they thus comprise the 
‘working poor’.2 The pool of the ‘working 
poor’ and that of the ‘walking poor’ has 
grown after each of the coups (Chand 
2007, this issue). Households most at risk 
of being in poverty or falling into poverty 
include the destitute, comprising single 
mothers, widows, the disabled, the elderly 

Pacific  Economic  BullEtin
Economic  survey
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 22 Number 2 2007 © Asia Pacific Press
Table 1 Basic data on Fiji, 1970–2006
Series GDP growth  GDP per Gross capital Foreign  Population Urban Population 
  capita   formation direct  aged 15–64 population growth 
     investment, 
    net inflows 
 (annual  (constant  (per cent (per cent (per cent (per cent (annual  
 per cent) 2000 US$) of GDP) of GDP) of total) of total)  per cent)
1970 12.70 1,357.36 22.16 2.91 54.05 34.80 2.10 
1971 6.89 1,420.78 24.82 2.62 54.82 35.18 2.10 
1972 7.49 1,495.72 23.96 2.68 55.62 35.56 2.08 
1973 11.61 1,635.55 22.23 3.69 56.37 35.94 2.05 
1974 2.60 1,644.85 18.91 2.56 57.00 36.32 2.00 
1975 0.53 1,621.73 20.63 2.06 57.48 36.70 1.94 
1976 2.74 1,635.48 21.49 1.06 57.80 36.92 1.85 
1977 5.90 1,701.44 23.18 2.38 57.96 37.14 1.78 
1978 1.86 1,702.13 22.76 1.47 58.03 37.36 1.81 
1979 12.22 1,873.35 31.05 1.00 58.06 37.58 1.95 
1980 –1.60 1,804.08 31.84 3.02 58.09 37.80 2.15 
1981 6.33 1,872.58 34.28 2.93 58.14 37.94 2.41 
1982 –5.98 1,715.71 25.56 3.08 58.20 38.08 2.58 
1983 –3.96 1,606.93 21.14 2.84 58.26 38.22 2.51 
1984 8.39 1,705.14 18.92 1.98 58.32 38.36 2.13 
1985 –4.61 1,601.30 19.07 1.90 58.39 38.50 1.56 
1986 7.75 1,709.61 18.22 0.62 58.44 39.12 0.92 
1987 –6.62 1,590.22 16.03 1.37 58.51 39.74 0.40 
1988 0.96 1,603.61 12.88 2.85 58.61 40.36 0.11 
1989 7.44 1,719.94 13.43 0.74 58.78 40.98 0.17 
1990 3.60a 1,769.81 14.28 6.87 59.03 41.60 0.47 
1991 –2.70a 1,713.18 15.71 0.37 59.36 42.38 0.85 
1992 6.10a 1,824.49 12.77 6.76 59.77 43.16 1.14 
1993 2.60 1,847.24 15.98 5.58 60.22 43.94 1.33 
1994 5.10 1,915.25 13.49 3.70 60.69 44.72 1.36 
1995 2.50 1,938.19 13.58 3.49 61.16 45.50 1.28 
1996 4.80 2,007.32 11.32 0.11 61.63 46.06 1.18 
1997 –2.20 1,941.17 11.51 0.74 62.09 46.62 1.13 
1998 1.30 1,945.42 15.91 6.48 62.54 47.18 1.07 
1999 8.80 2,094.83 14.94 –1.79 62.94 47.74 1.03 
2000 –1.70 2,038.61 12.59 –1.08 63.29 48.30 1.01 
2001 2.00 2,059.27 13.80 2.62 63.58 48.80 0.97 
2002 3.20 2,105.50 15.90 1.15 63.82 49.30 0.93 
2003 1.00 2,107.73 16.00 1.21 64.02 49.80 0.89 
2004 5.30 2,200.61 17.00 3.63 64.23 50.30 0.85 
2005 0.70 2,198.00 .. –0.14 64.45 50.80 0.82 
2006 2.00 .. .. .. .. .. 
a drawn from Fiji, 2001. Key Statistics, December 2000, Bureau of Statistics, Government of the Republic of Fiji 
Islands, Suva:9. 
Source: World Bank, 2007. World Development Indicators, World Bank, Washington, DC.
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and the chronically ill, and family members 
of imprisoned breadwinners. Those with 
casual work, often comprising the unskilled 
with earnings below the poverty line, 
including agricultural workers, bottom-
rung garment factory employees and 
security guards fall into this group as well 
as those in rural areas with limited access to 
basic health, education, and infrastructure 
services and the landless urban settlers 
(UNDP 1997; Barr and Naidu 2002 quoted 
in Abbott 2007; Asian Development Bank 
2003). Unfortunately, the ranks of each of 
these groups have been swelling over the 
past decade. The poorer households, on 
average, also have more dependents.
Abbott (2007:2) notes that urban poverty 
was the highest amongst households living 
in settlements and Housing Authority areas. 
Furthermore, the settlement population 
overall is expanding at an annual rate of 3.7 
per cent; informal (vakavanua) settlements 
are growing at more than 5 per cent; peri-
urban areas in Nadi are reported to be 
growing at an annual rate of 11.2 per cent, 
while Savusavu (growing at 12.8 per cent), 
Sigatoka (growing at 9.1 per cent), and Ba 
(growing at 8.4 per cent) are all expanding 
rapidly (McKinnon et al. 2007). This trend is 
likely to continue given that leases continue 
to expire and that some 45 per cent of 
Indo-Fijian arrivals in the settlements since 
2000 have been those whose leases had 
expired. The implications of these trends 
for health, security, and poverty are simply 
staggering (McKinnon et al. 2007). The 
concentration of poverty in the burgeoning 
settlements runs the risk of keeping asset-
poor households in poverty permanently. 
Serious pockets of poverty have already 
developed amongst households within parts 
of urban settlements and rural areas facing 
sharp declines in agricultural income.
The coups and the ensuing political 
instability have adversely affected 
investment. Gross domestic investment 
(GDI) peaked at 34 per cent of GDP in 
1981, dropped to 12 per cent in 1988 (after 
the first two coups), and hovered around 
13 per cent in 2000 (Figure 2).3 These falls 
took place despite the introduction of tax 
incentives for investments for exports. 
Table 2 Income and poverty levels for a sample of countries
Country HDI Per capita Population  Poverty  
   GDP without access to (per cent of 
    improved water population) 
    (per cent) 
Belarus 0.794 6,970 - 41.9 
Colombia 0.790 7,256 7 64.0 
Kazakhstan 0.774 7,440 14 34.6 
Philippines 0.763 4,614 28 36.8 
Fiji 0.758 6,066 53 34.4 
Sri Lanka 0.755 4,390 29 25.0 
Indonesia 0.711 3,609 23 27.1 
Papua New Guinea 0.523 2,543 61 37.5
Notes: The poverty data is for the most recent period available between 1990 to 2003 while HDI and per capita 
GDP data is for 2004.  
Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2007. Human Development Report: human development and 
climate change, United Nations Development Programme, New York.
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Figure 2 Investment, 1970–2005
Source: World Bank, 2007. World Development Indicators, World Bank, Washington, DC.
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Foreign direct investment, the form of 
investment most sensitive to political 
uncertainty, was negative in 1999 and 
2000. The small turnaround in GDI after 
2002 can be attributed to increased public 
sector investment and to the construction of 
several (lumpy) private-sector investments 
in tourism (hotel) infrastructure. There is 
anecdotal evidence to suggest that the 2006 
coup has stalled several investment projects. 
If so, the effects will be captured in the 
data some years down the track. The falls 
in investment following past coups have 
been accompanied by an exodus of skilled 
personnel; thus, the economy has suffered 
a double whammy of the loss of financial 
and human capital. Again, the data are not 
yet available to show if the same thing has 
happened following the 2006 coup. 
The more immediate and pressing 
challenge for the government is maintaining 
the budget deficit within the 2 per cent of 
GDP level announced in the budget and 
for the Reserve Bank of Fiji to maintain an 
adequate level of foreign reserves. 
Fiscal position 
The Interim Finance Minister announced the 
theme of his budget as ‘securing financial and 
economic stability’. While the Minister did 
not define what he meant by these two terms, 
the first is interpreted as achieving fiscal 
sustainability while the latter is interpreted 
as achieving internal and external balance. 
Priority has been given to the former in the 
revised budget. 
Securing financial stability entails 
reducing expenditure, raising income, and/
or improving productivity of public outlays 
to contain any deterioration in access to 
public services. The Minister warned that 
failing to contain the deficit would result in 
a devaluation of the Fiji dollar. While budget 
deficits and current account deficits have 
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a close association, linking fiscal policy to 
the value of the Fiji dollar may have been a 
mistake, particularly when the risk of capital 
flight following the coup remains significant. 
The government may achieve its deficit 
target but this will be no guarantee against 
a devaluation of the currency. Ultimately, 
current account sustainability will hold sway 
in determining the value of the currency. 
The decision to devalue the currency, thus, 
would be driven by considerations of 
ensuring external balance. 
Savings in the revised budget have 
been achieved through a salary cut of 5 
per cent for public servants. While this 
salary cut is lower than the 12.5 per cent 
and 15 per cent pay cuts following the 
coups of 2000 and 1987, respectively, public 
servants were also denied the 4 per cent 
cost of living adjustment agreed to with the 
ousted government. Total savings from this 
measure have been estimated at F$70 million. 
Amongst the major revenue initiatives is an 
increase in the airport departure tax from 
F$25 to F$40 that is anticipated to raise an 
additional F$7.9 million. VAT has been left 
at 12.5 per cent instead of the 15 per cent 
in the original budget brought down by 
the ousted government in November 2006. 
Government debt as of 2006 was estimated 
at 53 per cent of GDP. With a projected 
budget deficit of 2 per cent of GDP, the debt 
level is going to be pushed up further. 
While the motivations for containing 
public expenditure are clear, the impact of 
these on public sector productivity could 
be devastating. Salaries of public servants 
have barely kept pace with inflation since 
1993 (Table 3 and Figure 3). Nurses entering 
the public service at the beginning of 2007 
following graduation with a Diploma 
earned 22 per cent more, in 1993 dollars, 
than in 1993—an implied annual growth 
rate of real (that is, inflation adjusted) salary 
of 1.4 per cent. Nursing salaries, moreover, 
have hardly kept pace with inflation for 
the first six years of the new millennium. 
Compounding the poor real income growth 
has been the high demand for nurses 
abroad; entry level salaries for registered 
nurses in Western Australia as of July 2006, 
for example, were almost four times that of 
their counterparts in Fiji. While repeated 
attempts to obtain data from the authorities 
on salaries of other professionals, such 
as graduate teachers, were unsuccessful, 
the conclusions with respect to nurses are 
expected to hold for the rest of the public 
service. Salary cuts for public servants, 
therefore, are likely to adversely affect 
productivity, while the lower productivity 
could just as much be a justification for 
real wage reductions. The joint effect of the 
above, together with aggressively pursued 
affirmative action polices within the public 
service, have induced emigration of those 
with internationally marketable skills, thus 
weighing down public-sector productivity 
even further.4 
Efforts are being made to raise 
productivity of public expenditures via 
civil service reforms, however. The number 
of ministries has been reduced from 23 to 
16 while a taskforce has been established to 
consider strategies for improving efficiency 
and productivity of the public service. 
However, while the budget has expressed 
the wish of the Interim Government to 
reform public enterprises with a view to 
increasing competition, no explicit mention 
has been made regarding privatisation of 
these enterprises. On the whole, the revised 
budget falls short in terms of details as 
to how an economic turnaround will be 
engineered.
Monetary stance
The conduct of monetary policy is the 
responsibility of the Reserve Bank of Fiji. The 
bank targets price stability whilst ensuring 
that an adequate supply of foreign exchange 
is maintained. Interest rates have been 
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Table 3 Entry salary for graduate nurses in Fiji, 1993–2007
  CPI Nominal Real 
   (F$) (F$)
1993 100.0 7,784 7,784 
1994 100.8 7,929 7,866 
1995 103.0 8,250 8,009 
1996 106.1 8,459 7,973 
1997 109.7 8,713 7,943 
1998 116.0 8,974 7,736 
1999 118.3 9,243 7,813 
2000 119.6 9,871 8,253 
2001 124.7 11,619 9,318 
2002 125.6 11,851 9,436 
2003 130.9 12,204 9,323 
2004 134.6 12,695 9,432 
2005 137.7 12,695 9,219 
2006 141.2 13,580 9,618 
2007 145.4 13,847 9,521
Notes: Real salaries are at 1993 prices, obtained by deflating the nominal salaries by the CPI for the year. 
An inflation rate of 3 per cent has been assumed for 2007. The salaries used are for those with a Diploma, a 
qualification introduced in 1994, which earned two increments above those with a certificate qualification prior 
to this date. The salaries for 2000 are those following the cut after the coup while that for 2007 is pre-cut salary. 
The salary cut of 2000 was reinstated in 2001. 
Source: Data provided by the Fiji Nurses Association via Professor Ron Duncan, University of the South Pacific. 
Figure 3 Entry salary for graduate nurses, 1993–2007
Source: Table 3.
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used to target the former while the value of 
the exchange rate and capital controls have 
been used to ensure that foreign reserves 
remain at healthy levels. Inflation for 2006 
was recorded at 3 per cent, and has hovered 
around this figure since 2004; thus, on price 
stability the Reserve Bank of Fiji has had 
considerable success. Its record in terms 
of maintaining a healthy stock of foreign 
reserves has not been as favourable. Fiji has 
traditionally maintained reserves sufficient 
for 6 months of merchandise import cover, 
but the level has dropped steadily from some 
5.7 months of import cover in 2004 to 3.3 
months of import cover by December 2006. 
Furthermore, the stock of foreign reserves as 
of December 2006 of F$823 million included 
the proceeds from the bond issue of US$150 
million in September 2006. The pressure on 
foreign exchange reserves was relieved by 
the ratcheting up of interest rates prior to the 
coup and the ratcheting-up of capital controls 
since. The Reserve Bank of Fiji has rationalised 
these interventions as being ‘necessary to 
ensure that reserves are safeguarded under 
the current circumstances’ (Reserve Bank of 
Fiji 2006:33).5
The pressure on foreign reserves, 
however, predates the coup, which would 
only have exacerbated the problems. Both 
the nominal and the real (that is inflation 
adjusted) exchange rate have appreciated 
since 2003 (Reserve Bank of Fiji 2006:19). The 
nominal exchange rate is a weighted average 
of five currencies namely the Australian, New 
Zealand, and the United States dollars, the 
euro, and the Japanese yen. The weights are 
not disclosed (but can be readily computed 
from the data),6 and thus may be altered 
as an instrument of policy. Alternatively, 
the Reserve Bank of Fiji has the option of 
devaluing/revaluing the dollar. Both of these 
options have been used in the past. 
The revealed weights in the Fiji dollar 
are US$ 30 per cent, A$ 30 per cent, euro 
24 per cent and NZ$ 16 per cent. While the 
weights for Australia and New Zealand 
are broadly in line with the share of these 
two economies in total merchandise trade, 
this is not true for Japan and the United 
States which accounted for 5 and 7 per cent, 
respectively, of total merchandise trade 
for 2005. The daily data indicate that the 
Japanese yen had a statistically significant 
weight, albeit of a very small magnitude, 
in determining the value of the Fiji dollar. 
Since all of the currencies in the basket have 
appreciated against the US dollar over the 
past 6 months, the Fiji dollar has followed 
suit. This has reduced the competitiveness 
of exports and encouraged imports, the 
cumulative effect of which would be 
reflected in terms of the pressure on the 
current account.7 
There is some evidence of the Fiji dollar 
being overvalued, by at least 12 per cent as 
of 16 April 2007. This conclusion is gleaned 
from a simple comparison on the value of 
an investment in sovereign bonds vis-à-vis 
holding the same in Fiji dollar at home. 
The value of the bond fell by 14 percentage 
points immediately after the coup with the 
yield spiking commensurately, but then 
recovering much of the lost ground by 
mid April 2007 (Figure 5). This rebound, 
however, is only half of the story. An 
investor with F$173.76 as of 12 September 
2006 could, at least in theory, have bought 
the bond (call this Option 1) or alternatively 
deposited this money in a term deposit 
at home (call this Option 2). We will, for 
simplicity, assume that the deposit at home 
earns the same interest of 7 per cent per 
annum as earned on the bond. The daily 
movement in the value of the above options 
is tracked, where Option 2 is converted to 
US dollars at the daily official exchange 
rate (Figure 5). Option 2 gives a 12 per 
cent greater return than Option 1 by mid 
April 2007. The value of the bonds reflects 
investor confidence in the capacity of the 
government to service its debt while the 
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Figure 4 Fiji sovereign bond price, 13 September 2006–27 April, 2007
Source: JP Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Ltd.
Figure 5 Extent of over-valuation of the Fiji dollar, 12 September 2006–13 April 2007
Source: JP Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Ltd.
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value of the currency is the result of the 
formulaic impositions on its determination 
from the Reserve Bank of Fiji, with the latter 
standing guard to protect it.
Absent capital controls, and with an 
open capital account, arbitrage would 
be expected between the two investment 
options: the difference, therefore, is in the 
main due to capital controls. Despite this 
clear evidence of an overvalued Fiji dollar, 
the Reserve Bank of Fiji has been reluctant 
to devalue the dollar. This reluctance is 
perhaps due to a fear of destabilising the 
currency by devaluation, particularly when 
the markets have been anticipating one. 
Capital controls are more effective during 
short bouts of uncertainty such as following 
a coup, as demonstrated with earlier coups. 
On its own, devaluation could have induced 
a run on the currency, forcing the hand of 
the authorities to devalue the currency 
further, even if this was not necessary prior 
to the coup. But, these strategies work 
only in the short term since investors find 
alternate means of circumventing the capital 
controls or consumers go on an import binge 
in the face of an imminent devaluation. 
However, the evidence of an over-valued 
exchange rate existed long before the coup 
of December 2006. 
The Reserve Bank of Fiji has been 
easing liquidity recently (while at the same 
time tightening capital controls in order to 
protect foreign reserves) in order to stimulate 
domestic investment. The Bank has been 
directing credit to investments and rationing 
the supply of foreign exchange in the hope of 
encouraging exports. Success on this front, 
however, has been less than encouraging. 
This can be concluded from the Reserve 
Bank of Fiji’s repeated warnings regarding 
falling export income and buoyant imports, 
and thus a widening current account deficit; 
but it has yet to acknowledge that at least 
some of the blow-out in the current account 
may be of its own making.8 
The Reserve Bank of Fiji’s interventions 
go well beyond its mandate of maintaining 
price stability and a healthy level of foreign 
reserves, as well as being intensive in 
monitoring capacity—something that the 
Reserve Bank of Fiji lacks. An easier solution 
to restoring external balance would have 
been to devalue the currency followed by 
an easing of capital controls so as to tap 
into the benefits of rapidly growing regional 
and global economies. The queuing costs 
for foreign exchange and the implicit tax 
on export of capital from the myriad of 
regulations all raise costs of investment, 
and thus penalise growth and stall recovery. 
In my view, the Reserve Bank of Fiji has 
unnecessarily entangled itself in activities 
beyond its mandate and capacity while 
at the same time locking itself out from 
devaluing the dollar. The longer the Reserve 
Bank of Fiji holds out on devaluation, the 
larger the correction necessary to restore 
external balance. The only potential saviour 
in such an eventuality would be capital 
inflows sufficient to offset the current 
account imbalances—a possibility only 
with a substantial rebound in investor 
confidence. 
Employment conditions are likely to 
remain subdued until investment picks 
up. In the meanwhile, workers who have 
lost jobs and those with reduced hours of 
work are likely to face hardship. There is 
considerable anecdotal evidence of rising 
poverty, particularly within the urban 
informal settlements. In its February 2007 
Survey, the Fiji Employers Federation noted 
increased redundancies, reduced hours of 
work and temporary termination of work, 
all of which will increase in the absence of an 
economic rebound. Since independence Fiji 
has witnessed an increase in the working-
age population, particularly within the 
urban centres (see Table 1). Unless utilised, 
this demographic bonus could be a recipe 
for further social and economic problems.
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Sectoral prospects
Garments
Prior to 1987, Fiji had a small garment 
sector, but exports grew rapidly after 
1987 (Storey 2005). The major drivers of 
this change were domestic, including: the 
devaluation of the Fiji dollar by some 33 
per cent in 1987; the offer of tax concessions 
and publicly subsidised infrastructure,9 
and, a wage freeze and restraints on labour 
unions following the first coup. External 
conditions were also favourable, including 
the preferences afforded via SPARTECA,10 
the 1991-introduction of the Australian 
Import Credit Scheme, the high tariffs 
imposed in Australia on textiles, clothing 
and footwear (TCF) imports, and the Multi-
fibre Arrangement (MFA) quotas provided 
to Fiji. What changed in 1987 were the 
domestic conditions. Thus the growth of 
garment exports in 1987 and later must be 
attributed to these factors only.
What has changed since? On the 
domestic front inflation has picked up, 
diminishing the real value of the dollar. 
Wages, overall, have risen but without any 
evidence of a commensurate increase in 
productivity and the tax exemptions have 
expired. The Fiji dollar was devalued by 
further 20 per cent in 1998, but without the 
wage restraints of the earlier era. We have 
had two more coups since, but without the 
export incentives offered earlier. Political 
instability has continued since 2000 and so 
has the emigration of the skilled workforce. 
The domestic distortions have biased local 
investment into acquisition of skills and 
qualifications for emigration, thus penalising 
the growth of local and internationally 
competitive industries. External conditions 
have changed in the interim. China has 
entered the scene with its ability to mass 
produce garments at a fraction of the cost 
of its nearest competitors. The MFA expired 
at the end of 2004. The Australian tariffs 
on TCF imports have been falling, even 
though the TCF clauses of SPARTECA have 
been extended for seven years. Australian 
tariffs will fall further under its APEC/WTO 
commitments. This will increase competitive 
pressures faced by the local industry. Fiji can 
do little about stalling these changes.
The consequences of the decline in the 
garment industry have been growth in ‘the 
working poor’ and an industry that has been 
locked into producing a narrow range of 
products that are intensive in the use of low-
cost labour for a single market. What could 
have been done or, rather, what can be done, 
given the changing external conditions, 
to assist the garment industry? Local 
protection is definitely not the answer, as it 
will only exacerbate the existing problems. 
Another tax-free zone will probably be 
of little and at best temporary relief. The 
tax-free zones were initiated during a 
period of civil strife with a view to seeding 
the establishment of an internationally 
competitive manufacturing sector. It was 
clear from the start that the incentives 
offered were temporary but rationalised 
on the grounds that the industry would 
move up the value-adding chain, possibly 
into more sophisticated manufacturing and 
potentially services, once the base had been 
built. Why did this not eventuate? 
Continued political instability, the lack 
of personal safety, and a sense of insecurity 
in relation to fixed investments, particularly 
in the aftermath of the 2000 coup and the 
subsequent mutiny at the military barracks, 
have been the major disincentives to growth 
of a local and internationally competitive 
industry. As the international literature 
suggests, subsidies offered on infant-industry 
grounds have seldom been successful. There 
is substantial anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that the insecurity since the first coup has 
induced investments into mobile (human) 
capital that, in turn, has fuelled the high 
emigration. It is these domestic factors that 
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need redressing if employment conditions 
are to be improved. The challenge is not to 
save the garment sector per se but to support 
investment and growth of the domestic 
economy as a whole.
Sugar
The sugar industry, which includes the 
growing of sugarcane and manufacture 
of sugar for exports, has historically had a 
central place in the economy. The industry 
still provides the livelihoods of a large part 
of the population and remains a major 
earner of foreign exchange. Sugarcane 
production peaked at 4.38 million tonnes 
in 1996 when it accounted for some 11 
per cent of GDP and some 37 per cent of 
merchandise exports (measured net of re-
exports). As of 2005, the most recent period 
for which published data is available, sugar 
accounted for 6 per cent of GDP and some 26 
per cent of total merchandise exports (again 
excluding re-exports). Production has been 
declining over the past decade as leases of 
land on which the crop has been cultivated 
have been expiring. While some landowners 
have been induced into taking up sugarcane 
farming by government subsidies, many 
of the farms from which the tenants were 
displaced remain fallow. Incidentally, the 
decline in sugarcane production predates 
the announcement of price reductions by the 
Eurpoean Union but is coincidental with the 
uncertainty about the loss of leases (Prasad 
and Narayan 2004). 
The Interim Government has expressed 
its commitment to reviving the industry 
to its former health. The Interim Finance 
Minister announced in the budget the 
following investments as part of a sugar 
industry reform package
• the upgrading of mill facilities—to 
increase mill capacity and efficiency
• improvements to the mill transportation 
system—to reduce costs of carting cane
• modernising farming methods—to 
improve farm productivity, and
• diversification of industry risks into 
value-adding opportunities such as 
cogeneration of electricity and ethanol 
production. 
The Minister has since announced a target of 
raising sugarcane production by 1.3 million 
tonnes in three years time. Given the harvest 
of 3.2 million tonnes in 2006, this would 
mean returning production to its peak of 
1996. Mills are to be upgraded by 2008 while 
the Sugar Research Institute has been tasked 
to ‘educate’ the farmers in order to improve 
yields (Fiji Times online, 3 April 2007).
Returning the industry to its glory days 
may be difficult given that both domestic 
and international conditions for sugar have 
changed markedly (Chand 2005). Leased 
land, on which the bulk of sugarcane has 
been grown, continues to be vacated as 
leases expire. Many of the displaced farmers 
have been swelling the ranks of squatters 
around urban centres of the two main 
islands. While Fiji has an abundance of un-
farmed land, mobilising it for development 
has to date had limited success. This is in 
contrast to the success Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna 
had some 70 years ago (Ward 1995). On 
the external front, the European Union has 
announced a price reduction of 36 per cent 
to be spread over three years.
Much like garments, external conditions 
have conspired with deteriorating domestic 
conditions in weighing down the sugar 
industry. The solution, once again, is not 
in reviving the sugar industry per se but 
facilitating structural adjustment so as to 
assist the development of an internationally 
competitive domestic economy. Help with 
such adjustment has been promised from 
donors. The European Union has promised 
some F$132.6 million over the 2007 to 2010 
period in support of such a transition, with 
a similar amount promised for the 2011 to 
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2013 period. Access to these funds hit a 
snag following the recent coup, however. 
While some recent progress has been made 
in securing this support, the funds had 
not reached Fiji at the time of writing this 
survey. The promised support is crucial to 
alleviating the pains of adjustment for the 
labour and capital locked in the declining 
industries.
Support for adjustment to a subsidy-free 
environment is justified, particularly when 
the industry is large and the adjustment is 
likely to create large dislocations of labour 
and capital. The same argument cannot be 
made for trying to save, with taxpayer funds, 
an internationally uncompetitive industry. 
In this light, it is not clear that the current 
government attempt to save the sugar 
industry is a wise option. A more neutral 
regime, with the private sector given the 
responsibility to make these judgments, is 
definitely a superior strategy. This principle 
holds just as true for the garment sector. 
A neutral regime with respect to growth 
of individual industries offers the best 
chances for the emergence of internationally 
competitive industries. Policymakers have a 
role in ensuring competitive access to basic 
public goods, including policy stability, so 
that investors can plan with certainty over 
a long horizon. This requires a competitive 
interest rate, which in turn requires prudent 
macroeconomic management, including 
a low and stable inflation rate and fiscal 
sustainability, security for persons and 
property, including low costs of enforcing 
debt contracts and supporting regulation.
Tourism
Tourism is a significant sector of the 
economy and, unlike sugar, one that has 
been expanding except for short periods 
following the coups. Tourist arrivals are 
extremely sensitive to perceptions of 
security in the host nation. If past coups 
are any guide, a rebound in tourism 
numbers will happen quickly following 
a return to normalcy. The slow easing 
of travel warnings by the major source 
countries—Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States—appears to be contributing 
to a continuing decline in visitor arrivals, 
despite the heavy discounting of hotel 
rooms (by as much as 40 per cent). 
Australia has been the major source 
nation for Fiji’s tourists, accounting for some 
35 per cent of the total arrivals of around 
550,000 in 2005; New Zealand came second 
with a share of 21 per cent; and the United 
States was third, accounting for a further 13 
per cent (Reserve Bank of Fiji 2006: Table 30). 
Fiji’s gross earnings from tourism in 2006 
have been provisionally estimated by the 
Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics at F$741.7 
million. This was an increase of F$8.5 million 
or 1.2 per cent over gross earnings of F$733.2 
million in 2005. The Bureau’s preliminary 
estimates show tourist arrivals in 2006 of 
545,168, a decrease of 4,743 or 0.9 per cent 
from the 549,911 arrivals during 2005. The 
last quarter of 2006, when political tensions 
were at their highest, was hit the hardest in 
terms of tourist arrivals. According to the 
Bureau, gross earnings from tourism for 
2006Q4 (Oct–Dec) totalled F$186.5 million, 
a decrease of F$2.1 million or 1.1 per cent 
over gross earnings of F$188.6 million for 
the corresponding period in 2005. This 
decline was due to a fall of 5.8 per cent in 
tourist arrivals, equal to 7,838, compared to 
2005Q4 (Fijilive, 27 April 2007). 
The prognosis for tourism in 2007 is 
less than promising. There are widespread 
media reports of hotel operators facing 
record vacancies and workers being laid 
off; Reserve Bank of Fiji (2007) reports hotel 
occupancy for March 2007 at 31 per cent. As 
of May 2007, Air Pacific, the national carrier, 
was in the process of cutting down services 
in the face of falling passenger numbers; 
the airline reported a drop in passenger 
numbers of 15 per cent in the first quarter 
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of 2007 compared to the corresponding 
period for 2006. The airline announced the 
cancellation of four flights per week from 
Sydney, one flight per week from Brisbane, 
three flights per week from Auckland, one 
flight per week from Tokyo, and deferred 
the commencement of a planned fifth 
weekly flight between Nadi and Los Angeles 
(Fijilive, 21 May 2007). This is a major 
setback, especially compared to the pre coup 
prospects for a rapid expansion in tourist 
arrivals following the completion of several 
major hotels. There were several other resort 
developments either in the pipeline or being 
planned. The slump in visitor arrivals and 
the heavy discounting by hotels will hurt 
profitability of existing operators, many of 
whom have sunk substantial amounts of 
capital into immovable assets—even more 
importantly, the slump will scare away 
future investments. This is unfortunate 
since Fiji has many natural advantages, 
including being centrally located within the 
Asia Pacific region, having well-developed 
infrastructure with a hospitable citizenry, 
and the climate and close to pristine 
natural environment to excel as a tourist 
destination for the swelling ranks of the 
middle class in the region. An expansion 
of the tourism industry would have taken 
much of the pressure off the Fijian economy 
with respect to the adverse employment and 
foreign exchange earnings impacts from the 
declining garment and sugar sectors. 
Information and communications 
technology
There has been some recent growth in 
the information and communications 
technology (ICT) sector. Fiji has locational 
advantages since the Southern Cross 
cable and the international dateline both 
pass close by. Fiji, furthermore, has an 
English-speaking and relatively skilled 
workforce able to support data processing. 
An uncompetitive telecommunications 
sector has been a major drag on the ICT 
industry, an issue that has been taken 
up by the Interim Government (Duncan 
2004, 2007). The Interim Minister for 
Commerce has announced the government’s 
intention to induce increased investments 
into business process outsourcing and 
call centres, software development, and 
information technology training. The 
specifics, in terms of the inducements to be 
offered to investors, remain to be detailed, 
however. The government does not have 
the resources to provide tax concessions 
to individual investors and doing so, in 
any case, is unlikely to attract the scale 
of investments that is required. Access to 
a more competitive telecommunications 
and public infrastructure is likely to be a 
lot more helpful than policies targeted at 
development of particular industries or 
localities (Duncan 2007). 
The way forward
The immediate challenges for government 
are in addressing the growing fiscal pressures 
and addressing problems of governance, 
whilst raising the rate of growth of the 
economy. Some thoughts on the possible 
policy options to address these challenges 
are explored next.
Attaining fiscal sustainability has been 
an immediate priority. The government 
has announced its intention to contain the 
budget deficit to 2 per cent of GDP and 
reduce the level of public debt to 45 per 
cent of GDP over the medium term. The 
revised budget brought down in March 2007 
projected total revenues of F$1,471 million, 
an increase of nearly 6 per cent over the 
estimate for 2006 and an 8 per cent decline 
from the projection for the 2007 Budget 
brought down by the ousted regime in 
November 2006. Total expenditure for 2007 
has been anticipated in the revised budget 
at F$1,572 million, a revision downwards 
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of 8 per cent from the earlier estimates for 
2007 but still a 2 per cent increase over 
the figure for 2006. The revenue estimates 
in the revised budget are based on an 
economic contraction of 2.5 per cent of 
GDP. On current trends, particularly the 
falling tourist numbers as of May 2007, 
GDP is likely to contract by more than this. 
The revenue projections, particularly when 
compared to the estimates for 2006, look 
optimistic. Containing the deficit to 2 per 
cent of GDP, therefore, may entail much 
greater expenditure cuts than originally 
envisioned. The commitment to containing 
the deficit within the announced target 
could be counter-productive, particularly if 
it is achieved at the expense of investments 
necessary to induce growth of output. 
The projected budget deficit of 2 
per cent is based on a lower projected 
increase in expenditures than in revenues. 
Lower growth or even cuts in recurrent 
expenditure run the risk of further eroding 
access to public services, which is crucial for 
attracting private investment. Therefore, 
the government would, sooner rather 
than later, be forced to consider additional 
revenue raising measures. The challenge 
in introducing additional taxes would be 
in ensuring that they do not discourage 
private investment. Raising taxes on 
mobile capital and skilled labour could be 
counterproductive as this will only induce 
them to leave the shores of Fiji, leaving 
those factors that are unable to move worse 
off after the taxes. If anything, conditions 
should be made more attractive for these 
mobile factors to remain to provide the 
impetus for private sector growth.
Unskilled labour and land, being 
immobile and thus unable to evade 
taxes, are the only possible candidates 
for increased taxation. Taxing income of 
labour poses several logistical problems 
while also being regressive. This leaves 
land, on several grounds, as the preferred 
candidate for taxation. First, land cannot 
escape offshore; it cannot hide; the owners 
are not the poorest in the community; and 
its supply is fixed. Even more importantly, 
taxing land could induce its mobilisation 
for productive use. The politics of taxing 
land and enforcing compliance may pose 
significant and possibly insurmountable 
difficulties, however.11 
Governance for growth
The newly established Fiji Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) 
has much to live up to. The Commission 
has the powers to investigate corruption 
and report these directly to the President. 
Another special unit is to be set up within the 
Finance Ministry to carry out investigations 
of all allegations of abuse of public funds. 
According to the Interim Minister for 
Finance, this special unit will be equipped 
with competent and experienced auditors 
empowered to visit agencies unannounced, 
conduct spot checks, and prepare timely 
audit reports. Unless this unit is a simple 
revamp of the Internal Audit Unit within the 
Ministry, it may entail costs of duplication. 
While it is often reported that corruption 
has risen significantly over the past decade, 
and thus combating its rise is long overdue, 
the creation of new agencies with parallel 
responsibilities to existing ones is unlikely to 
be productive. Arguments for economies of 
scale in fraud investigation and prosecution 
would suggest that amalgamation of 
existing agencies could have been a better 
alternative. 
For the bulk of its post-independence 
history, Fiji has been governed democratically. 
Normalcy, therefore, requires a return to 
constitutional rule—a fact that has been 
put as a precondition for the complete 
re-engagement of the donor community. 
The medium to long-term challenge for 
the Interim Government is to chart a 
path to constitutional rule. A rebound in 
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the economy is likely to assist in such a 
transition while an economic crisis is just as 
likely to spill over into political chaos. 
Conclusions
In bringing down its 2007 Budget, the 
Interim Government announced that it 
was either a ‘swim or sink’ situation for the 
country. The Interim Minister for Finance 
announced his intentions of belt tightening, 
particularly with respect to recurrent 
outlays. On assessments up to April, the 
extent of belt tightening may not have been 
sufficient to ensure that the budget deficit 
remains within the target 2 per cent of GDP. 
Absent a strong rebound in the economy, 
debt levels are equally unlikely to return to 
45 per cent of GDP over the medium term as 
announced in the budget. The government, 
therefore, may be forced to reconsider its 
deficit target set for 2007.
Foreign reserves have been falling 
since 2002 and are unlikely to rebound 
soon given prevailing policies. Efforts 
by the Reserve Bank of Fiji to protect 
reserves using tightened capital controls, 
and the introduction of a credit ceiling on 
commercial banks, are going to raise the 
cost of credit, making economic recovery 
all the more difficult. The Reserve Bank of 
Fiji, in all likelihood, has got itself tangled 
up in rationing foreign exchange while the 
nominal (and the real) exchange rate(s) 
have appreciated sharply since September 
2006. The loss of foreign reserves due 
to the worsening of the trade balance, 
therefore, could be of its own making. On 
one measure, that of the difference in the 
value of Fiji’s sovereign bond with the 
official exchange rate, the F$ was over-
valued by 12 per cent as of 16 April 2007.12 
Macroeconomic stability requires a return 
to fiscal sustainability and external balance. 
As regards the former, new revenue raising 
measures need to be considered while on 
the latter, the Reserve Bank of Fiji’s arm 
may ultimately get twisted to devalue the 
dollar. The longer the Reserve Bank of Fiji 
holds out against devaluing the dollar, the 
larger the correction that will be necessary 
when its hand is forced. The only saviour 
would be large capital inflows and/or 
substantially increased exports, both of 
which are unlikely without a substantial 
boost in investor confidence.
There is little choice but to revive the 
economy. The position as of April 2007 was 
neither one of sinking nor swimming but 
more akin to floating. Continuing with the 
water metaphor, the economy had been 
taking in water well before the December 
coup. Total investment as a share of GDP 
had reached a low of 11.3 per cent by 1996, 
with each of the coups pushing the economy 
back by an average of three years in terms 
of per capita income. The challenge for 
the policymakers in raising growth is both 
to improve the immediate conditions for 
investment and putting in place measures 
to prevent future coups.
As regards the prospects for an early 
economic revival, tourism offers the best 
potential. Gold and garments have both 
made their retreat in terms of foreign 
exchange earnings and their contribution to 
employment generation. The international 
conditions for sugar are rapidly changing, 
and thus hope of its revival could be 
misplaced. Furthermore, the problems 
within the garment and sugar industries are 
the cumulative effects of long-standing and 
unattended local problems. The increased 
pace of liberalisation of global trade over 
the recent past has only exacerbated the 
pressures for change. Freer global trade poses 
risks to individual economies, but these risks 
can be managed. Fiji has failed to do this. 
The policy challenge is one of providing 
a local environment conducive to investment 
by the private sector. It is the private sector 
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that is best positioned to assess the risks 
and rewards of specific investments. The 
public sector has an important role in 
providing public goods and adjustment 
assistance where dislocation of labour and 
capital are likely to be large. The garment 
and sugar sectors qualify on the latter 
consideration. Trying to ‘save’ an industry 
that otherwise would have collapsed in 
the face of international competition is 
tantamount to throwing good taxpayer 
funds to waste. This issue is particularly 
relevant to the proposed reforms of the 
sugar industry, which are being funded 
with a loan.
ICT activities form a small, albeit growing, 
sector. Its expansion, as much as for other 
sectors, requires political stability, law and 
order, and a competitive communications 
and transport infrastructure. Providing 
these services in a climate where budgetary 
resources are likely to dwindle poses the 
severest challenge to economic management 
in contemporary Fiji. The rhetoric in 
the budget regarding the deregulation 
of the economy and improvements to 
governance is timely, but there is likely to 
be a considerable lag between words and 
deeds. Time, unfortunately, is not running 
in Fiji’s favour.
Notes
1 The growth figure for 2006 is likely to be 
revised downwards; the Governor of the 
Reserve Bank of Fiji has suggested a growth 
rate of 3.4 per cent.
2 The under-employed, who roam the streets 
in search of work, are the ‘walking poor’.
3 The figures used here are from the World 
Bank and are reported in Table 1. The Reserve 
Bank of Fiji gives slightly different numbers, 
but qualitatively similar conclusions.
4 This issue is taken up in further detail in a 
companion paper (Chand 2007, this issue).
5 Each of the coups has constituted a major 
shock to the economy, thus credit is due to the 
economic managers in averting an economic 
meltdown following past coups.
6 A simple regression of the Fiji dollar on the 
one-day lagged values of five currencies, 
where the US dollar is used as the numeraire, 
employing daily data from 30 June 2006 to 16 
April 2007 gives the following estimate
 F$/US$ = 0.43 + 0.44 A$/US$ + 0.35euro/US$ 
              (30.43)**    (35.32)**           (13.10)**        
        + 0.23NZ$/US$ + 0.00063¥/US$ + error
                   (43.02)**            (4.89)** 
  Adj-R2 = 0.997; n = 164.
7 While Fiji’s total merchandise trade with 
the United States is less than 10 per cent, US 
dollar-denominated trade still dominates. For 
example, all of mineral fuels imports and the 
bulk of the remaining imports are US dollar 
denominated.
8 The increase in the cost of mineral fuels 
accounted for just one-third of the 16.9 per 
cent increase in imports to November 2006 
(Reserve Bank of Fiji 2006:18).
9 The Kalabo tax free zone, for example, was 
built with a European Union grant of $7.25 
million dollars.
10 SPARTECA is a non-reciprocal trade 
agreement whereby Australia and New 
Zealand offer duty free access to all products 
originating from the developing island 
member countries of the Forum. SPARTECA 
came into effect for most Forum Island 
Countries from 1 January 1981 and the 
current list of countries includes Cook 
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa.
11 Land has been a rallying point for politicians 
all over Melanesia and most so in Fiji. Good 
economics parts company with good politics 
on issues pertaining to land, thus this may be 
politically infeasible.
12 This assumes that the currency was at par 
when the bonds were floated.
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